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RESÜMEE
Die Sowjetunion ging aus dem „Großen Vaterländischen Krieg“ als Sieger und zweite Super-
macht neben den USA hervor. Doch der Preis für diesen Triumph war schrecklich hoch. Der 
Krieg kostete schätzungsweise 27 Mio. Menschen das Leben, Millionen Soldaten kehrten ver-
stümmelt, blind oder chronisch krank von der Front zurück. Aufgrund rigider Anerkennungs-
verfahren wurden aber nicht alle dieser Kriegsopfer in die Statusgruppe der staatlich anerkann-
ten Kriegsinvaliden aufgenommen, die Anspruch auf Rentenzahlung und andere Privilegien 
geltend machen konnten. Aus staatlicher Sicht war vor allem die schnelle Wiedereingliede-
rung ins Arbeitsleben die beste Therapie gegen kriegsbedingte körperliche Leiden und wurde 
deshalb zum Hauptinstrument sowjetischer Sozialpolitik. Es fehlte allerdings an begleitenden 
Umschulungs- oder Ausbildungsprogrammen, medizinischen Rehabilitationsmaßnahmen und 
einer ausreichenden Zahl funktionstüchtiger Prothesen. Während die staatliche Propaganda 
„umfassende Fürsorge“ für die Kriegsversehrten in Aussicht stellte, erlebten sich diese selbst als 
„arme Sieger“.
1. Introduction
Th e question to what extent the Soviet Union was a welfare state, was fi rst raised in the 
1960s, however no thorough analytical response has yet been given.1 Th e Soviet leader-
ship granted the welfare idea a central place in its political propaganda from the very 
1 A. Nove, Towards a ‚Communist Welfare State’? Social Welfare in the USSR, in: Problems of Communism 9 (1960) 
1, 1–10; Ders., Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State, in: T. Riha (Hg.): Readings in Russian Civilization, Vol. III, Chicago 
1964, 745–756; B. Q. Madison, Social Welfare in the Soviet Union, Stanford / California 1968 as well as the litera-
ture in the paper by Mark Edele in this volume (Notes 36 and 37).
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beginning and declared that it wanted to create a new, just and content society in which 
exploitation would be abolished and the right to social security guaranteed. Th ese guid-
ing principles were upheld until the very collapse of the system.
Th is paper examines the pensions and benefi ts for disabled servicemen and asks to what 
extent the state lived up to the task it had set itself and fulfi lled the expectations that had 
been aroused.2 Th e ex-servicemen are an ideal object of study due to size and defi nition 
of the group; they also paid for the survival of the Soviet state with their health and, as in-
valids, had reason to expect special aid. First we will sketch the material and institutional 
conditions that the Bolsheviks inherited and then look at the recognition processes, the 
war-victim pensions and benefi ts, the reintegration of disabled soldiers into working life 
and their discontent with the Soviet social welfare system.
2. Background
In the closing years of tsarist Russia the entire welfare system was still in its infancy and 
the care for ex-servicemen and invalids lay primarily in the hands of private philan-
thropists.3 Th is changed, however, with the law of 25 June 1912,4 in which the Russian 
government laid the foundations for public-relief payments to war victims and, for the 
fi rst time, recognised the entitlement of all war invalids to pensions and free prosthetic 
devices.5 An applicant’s assets and family situation played no role – the degree of physical 
handicap alone determined the level of a pension. Nevertheless, as the payments did not 
cover the minimum income needed to exist, private charity remained important.6
Despite the immense costs involved, the Provisional Government (February–October 
1917) continued the new course in social policy, further increasing the benefi ts for ex-
servicemen7 and creating the Ministry of Public Welfare (Ministerstvo gosudarstvennogo 
prizreniia) – a novelty in Russian history. Th us the administrative foundations for the 
modern welfare state were laid down, which were set the task of overcoming the coun-
2 For the recognition of all former combatants as one status group and their combination into the category of 
veterans, see the paper by Mark Edele in this volume.
3 The development of pensions and benefi ts for war victims in the Russian Empire has yet to be studied syste-
matically, but see: E. Pyle, Village Social Relations and the Reception of Soldiers’ Family Aid Policies in Russia, 
1912–1921. Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Chicago/Illinois, 1997.
4 Pensii soldatam, ikh vdovam i sirotam. Zakon 25 iiunia 1912 s izdannymi v dopolnenie ego instruktsiiami i 
raz’’iasneniiami Pravitel’stvuiushchago Senata, Petrograd 1915. Two days earlier, on 23 June, 1912, the Tsar en-
dorsed the draft laws on workers’ health and accident insurance. In practice, however, they only applied to 
about 20% of workers: V. L. Stepanov, Die Sozialgesetzgebung Otto von Bismarcks und die russischen Arbeiter-
versicherungsgesetze, in: D. Beyrau, I. Čičurov und M. Stolleis (Hg.), Reformen im Rußland des 19. und 20. Jahr-
hunderts. Westliche Modelle und russische Erfahrungen, Frankfurt 1996, 109–138. For the precursors of the law, 
see: J. von Puttkamer, Anfänge russischer Sozialgesetzgebung. Die Politik der Regierung und die Haltung der 
Industrie zur Haftung bei Arbeitsunfällen, in: H. Haumann und S. Plaggenborg (Hg.), Aufbruch der Gesellschaft 
im verordneten Staat, Frankfurt/M. 1994, 186–216.
5 Kak russkomu soldatu i ego sem’e poluchit’ pensiiu i posobie, Moskva 1915, 17.
6 D. N. Borodin, Invalidnyj dom grafov Zubovykh, Moskva 1915, 5–6; see also: I. I. Charnomskaia, K voprosu o tru-
dovoi pomoshchi uvechnym voinam, St. Peterburg 1915, 9–10.
7 E. Pyle, Village Social Relations, 6.
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try’s backwardness in this fi eld. At the same time the care for disabled ex-servicemen was 
declared to be a governmental task.8 A new goal was formulated: to replace the current 
concentration on material support for “help to self-help”,9 which was essentially a refer-
ence to publically funded reintegration into working life.10 In addition, a fundamental 
reform of the private charity system was planned.
3. Invalid Welfare from the October Revolution to the First Five-Year Plan
Th e latter did not occur, however, because the Bolsheviks did away with all existing pri-
vate philanthropic institutions after the October Revolution and by 1920 had brought 
the entire social-welfare fi eld under public control. Th ey assumed self-assuredly that the 
welfare institutions of the future Soviet state would render every kind of traditional char-
ity redundant. In order to erase all memory of the pre-socialist period with its religiously 
inspired care for the poor and needy, on 17 April 1918 the public authority responsible 
for disabled servicemen was renamed the “People’s Commissariat of Public Welfare” 
(Narkomsobes) and the customary, emotionally charged designation “maimed soldier” 
(uvechnyi voin) was replaced by the neutral term “disabled serviceman” (invalid voiny). 
In practical terms, in view of empty coff ers, it was only possible to pay an elementary, 
minimum level of income to persons unable to work. After all, the Constitution of 1918 
established the requirement to work for every individual as a basic social principle: “He 
shall not eat who does not work”, it stated succinctly.11 Accordingly, a new concept of 
social welfare won ground: only persons who were completely incapacitated, unable to 
work, and who genuinely had no other means of subsistence (other income, support 
from family, etc.) would be able to benefi t.12 Since fulfi lling the interests of the workers 
was also a priority, the emphasis of welfare policy shifted away from disabled servicemen. 
During the New Economic Policy (NĖP) of the 1920s practically nothing remained 
of the tsarist government’s care obligation of 1912 which had guaranteed all sick and 
wounded soldiers the right to a pension: the overwhelming majority of the 2.7 million 
  8 Soveshchanie pri Ministerstve gosudarstvennago prizreniia po voprosam pomoshchi voenno-uvechnym, 4 
June, 1917: GARF 6787/1/37, sheet 37; speech by the Minister of Public Welfare, Prince D. I. Shakhovskoi, at the 
1st All-Russian Delegates’ Meeting of Wounded Soldiers, Petrograd, 15 June, 1917: GARF 6787/1/28, sheet 10.
  9 O zadachakh Ministerstva gosudarstvennago prizreniia v oblasti okazaniia pomoshchi voennouvechnym. Do-
klad d-ra G. F. Melenevskago, 1917: GARF 6787/1/30, sheet 39.
10 Letter of the Minister of Public Welfare to various ministries requesting that all suitable positions be fi lled with di-
sabled servicemen, 7 September, 1917: GARF 6787/1/30, sheets 81–82; circular of the Ministry of Agriculture on 
the allocation of workplaces to disabled servicemen, 19 September, 1917: GARF 6787/1/35, sheet 5; Zasedanie 
soveshchaniia po voprosu o trudovoi pomoshchi voenno-uvechnym so storony rabotodatelei i soiuzov raboto-
datelei, 22 September, 1917, 29 September,. 1917, 6 October, 1917: GARF 6787/1/38a, sheets 1–6, 10–11.
11 Constitution of the RSFSR, adopted by the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 10 July, 1918, in: H. Altrichter 
(Hg.), Die Sowjetunion. Von der Oktoberrevolution bis zu Stalins Tod. Bd. 1: Staat und Partei, München 1986, 
147.
12 Sotsial’noe obespechenie v Sovetskoi Rossii. Sbornik statei k s’’ezdu Sovetov. Pod red. A. Vinokurova, Moskva 
1919, 5.
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invalids of the First World War and Russian Civil War – predominantly peasants – re-
ceived no regular fi nancial support from the Soviet government.
Th e top echelons of the Party and government pleaded for an as comprehensive as pos-
sible reintegration of disabled servicemen into working life instead of fostering their 
“sinecure mentality” with pensions.13 However given the high unemployment during 
the NĖP this was out of the question, so the abject poverty of the invalids remained 
a mass phenomenon throughout the 1920s; but it was at least discussed in public and 
recognised as a social problem. Eff orts were also made to alleviate the veterans’ hardships 
through publically controlled fund-raising activities (donation appeals, lotteries, sale of 
commemorative stamps, calendars, etc.). Prints with depictions of begging invalids ap-
pealed to the population’s readiness to help.14 Th e state thus did not conceal that it was 
unable to meet its obligation towards the former soldiers alone, and was dependent on 
support from society.
Th is aid was increasingly sidelined in the course of the 1920s and the areas of responsibil-
ity of corresponding organisations were drastically curtailed. Th e government intended 
for the problem to be solved by public funds alone. Active reintegration into working life 
thus became the basic instrument of aid to war invalids, and a draft government resolu-
tion in 1930 declared it the “most practical form” of public welfare.15
4. The Stalinist Turnaround
Th e comparatively open and pragmatic approach to the issue of invalids ended abruptly 
in the 1930s. All existing societies and committees for aid to invalids were disbanded in 
1935 as their activities had become “redundant”.16 Th is by no means corresponded to 
social reality, so other methods were chosen to bring wish and reality into agreement. 
Undesirable social phenomena were defi ned out of existence and the individuals were 
treated with corresponding rigour, where necessary with repression. Life in the Soviet 
Union had become “better, and happier too”, Stalin proclaimed in 1935, and by defi ni-
tion there was no longer any place for inadequately supported invalids. Th e police now 
combated outcasts and outsiders, including disabled servicemen who were begging and 
homeless, and allegedly posed a threat to the Soviet state.17 Social control and state se-
curity increasingly fused, and the concept of a “menace to society” spread like wildfi re. 
13 Letter from Trotsky to the Narkomsobes and the Vserokompom, 17 January, 1922: RGVA 4/4/207, sheets 71–72; 
letter of the Narkomsobes to Trotsky, 25 January, 1922: RGVA 4/4/207, sheets 79–80; Postanovlenie Narkomso-
besa No. 115, 4 December, 1924: GARF 4347/1/219, sheet 9.
14 For example, see the poster “Don’t leave the Red Hero empty-handed, buy special-issue stamps!” (around 1920), 
in: M. Lafont, Soviet Posters. The Sergo Grigorian Collection, München u. a. 2007, 49.
15 GARF 4347/1/607, sheet 60.
16 GARF 1235/76/121, sheet 7. 
17 D. Shearer, Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin’s Russia. A Reassessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of 
Mass Repression, in: Cahiers du Monde russe, 39 (1998) 1 / 2, 139, 143; D. Shearer, Social Disorder, Mass Repressi-
on, and the NKVD during the 1930s, in: Cahiers du Monde russe, 42 (2001) 2 / 3 / 4, 526, 528, 534.
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Th e campaigns of repression peaked in 1937/38 in the bloody “mass operations” of the 
Great Terror,18 which also had the objective of rooting out social disorderliness once and 
for all. Although they were certainly not the main target, unemployed and homeless war 
invalids were also among the victims of the purges.19
Th e “socialist off ensive” in dealing with the disabled servicemen was pursued not only 
with repressive means but also through ideology. Heroic passion compensated for the 
lack of genuine public welfare and went hand in hand with the state’s terroristic prac-
tices. In order to mobilise the population – in particular young people – for the numer-
ous new “fronts of industry”, the myth of the Civil War had to be popularised. Yet real 
disabled servicemen were not suitable as role models. Th ey had learned the hard way 
what struggle meant and as a direct result were no longer able to fi ght the “battles to in-
crease production”; their primitive wooden crutches and empty sleeves were a reminder 
that not all wounds and deformities could be “overcome” by energy and will-power. Th ey 
were therefore condemned to be swept under the carpet of the 1930’s society committed 
to enthusiasm, optimism and heroism.
It was symptomatic and at the same time revealing of the condition of Soviet society in 
the early 1930s that a fi ctional, literary fi gure was stylised to be the glowing role model. 
Th e novel How the Steel was Tempered20 (1932–1934) by Nikolai A. Ostrovskii furnished 
the “fi tting hero” – Pavel Korchagin, a disabled serviceman who sacrifi ced himself, fi ght-
ing to his last breath to build socialism. Th e book does not address the cruelty of war 
and the agony of the wounded but glorifi es tireless struggle.21 It denies the existence of 
physical boundaries that cannot be mastered by human endeavour. Pavel Korchagin is 
the “victim hero” whose iron will keeps him in constant combat-readiness, despite his 
physical decline, and enables him to perform at peak level. From then on he occupied a 
central position in the pantheon of totalitarian heroes and became a powerful model for 
many people–invalids included.
Now the apparatus for dealing with invalidity was ready. No distinction was made be-
tween civilian and military invalids. Regardless whether the physical impairment re-
sulted at work or in defending the country, public welfare was fi rst and foremost to serve 
the “socialist off ensive” and help increase production. Th e social legacy of two wars was 
thus to be “surmounted” without great expense: with ideological axioms, and if necessary 
backed up with violence. A mixture of minimal care, reintegration pressure, repression 
of the non-integratables and all-encompassing hero-worship, shaped public attitudes to 
disabled servicemen from the 1930s until long after the “Great Patriotic War”.
18 R. Binner und M. Junge: Wie der Terror „groß“ wurde: Massenmord und Lagerhaft nach Befehl 00447, in: Cahiers 
du Monde russe 42 (2001) 2 / 3 / 4, 557–614; Dies.: „S ėtoj publikoj ceremonit’sja ne sleduet“. Die Zielgruppen des 
Befehls Nr. 00447 und der Große Terror aus der Sicht des Befehls Nr. 00447, in: Cahiers du Monde russe 43 (2002) 
1, 181–228.
19 There is no knowledge as to what proportion of the victims they made up.
20 Published 1932–1934, German edition 1947.
21 H. Günther, Das Tauwetter als Prozeß der Entkanonisierung, in: D. Beyrau / I. Bock (Hg.), Das Tauwetter und die 
Folgen. Kultur und Politik in Osteuropa nach 1956, Bremen 1988, 149.
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5. The Work-Related Concept of Invalidity and its Legal Consequences
Th e previous health-related view was superseded in 1932 by a concept of invalidity em-
bedded in labour-supply considerations.22 Invalidity was now no longer recognised with 
physical impairment in general but only when it meant total or partial loss of the ability 
to work. Th e fi rst category of invalidity under the new defi nition – the severely disabled 
– encompassed all persons completely unable to work and also dependent on constant 
care. Th e second group comprised those completely unable to work but not in need of 
care. Finally, the third category combined those still partially able to work, who could 
be employed under simplifi ed conditions in low-qualifi ed occupations, with correspond-
ingly low income.23 All those whose handicap did not force them to give up their profes-
sion were not recognised as invalids and had no pension entitlements at all – even when 
functional impairment was considerable.24
Th is production-related view of invalidity was fi rst applied on a large scale to the millions 
of those physically impaired in the “Great Patriotic War” (over 18 million wounded or 
serious ill soldiers), of whom 3.8 million were discharged from the Red Army as invalids 
during the war. In the post-war years only somewhere between 2.6 and 2.8 million of 
these were recognised as disabled servicemen and entitled to public benefi ts.25 Th e doc-
tors who undertook the classifi cation were instructed by the Ministry of Social Aff airs, 
in ever newer briefi ngs, to apply extremely strict standards. Th e example was given of an 
accounts clerk with a prosthetic device for his amputated lower leg. He was considered 
fully fi t for employment and thus not to be recognised as a disabled serviceman, even if 
his defect had led to his discharge from the army. Th e admission of such cases to the third 
category was only possible temporarily at best, the instructions said, where a wound 
needed to heal or to allow the person to adapt to new circumstances (using prosthetic 
devices, writing with the left hand, etc.).26 As the welfare offi  ces saw it, war wounds ei-
ther represented no impairment at all, were considered curable (through work!), or were 
to be overcome through adaptation. Th e physical impairment itself was thus trivialised 
and its consequences for the individual downplayed. Following a government directive, 
the disabled servicemen were regrouped between 1942 and 1948 in such a way that the 
majority of them again became available as manpower for the war economy or post-war 
reconstruction:
22 Trudovoe ustroistvo invalidov v SSSR. Sbornik normativnykh aktov i metodicheskikh materialov, Moskva 1963, 
56; S. M. Schwarz, Arbeiterklasse und Arbeitspolitik in der Sowjetunion, Köln 1953, 339.
23 Ibidem, 56.
24 Ibidem, 52–53.
25 G. F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, London 1997, 92; C. Merridale, 
Iwans Krieg: Die Rote Armee 1939–1945, Frankfurt a. M. 2006, 395.
26 A. Ia. Averbakh / M. V. Shirokova (Red.), Spravochnik po vrachebno-trudovoi ekspertize invalidov otechestvennoi 
voiny, Moskva 1943, 14; see also: A. Ia. Averbakh, Sostoianie vrachebno-trudovoi ėkspertizy v RSFSR i eë ochered-
nye zadachi, in N. M. Obodan (Red.): Vozvrashchenie k trudovoi deiatel’nosti invalidov, Leningrad 1945, 24, who 
even adduced the following example of full fi tness for employment: an accounts clerk, blind in one eye, with 
fi ngers 3–5 of the right hand missing and his left lower leg amputated.
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Table 1: Distribution of disabled servicemen in groups, RSFSR 1942–194827
September 1942 October 1944 January 1945 April 1948
1st group:  1.6 % 1.53 % 1.5 % 1.9 %
2nd group: 52.7 % 35.4 % 33.9 % 21.1 %
3rd group: 45.7 % 63.1 % 64.6 % 77.0 %
It is particularly conspicuous that the percentage in the second category declined mark-
edly in favour of the third. Whereas the second category made up the majority of all 
invalids (52.7%) in September 1942, the percentage declined to a third in January 1945 
and to just 21.1% in April 1948.28 Th ree years after war’s end more than three quarters 
of all recognised Soviet disabled servicemen (77%) belonged to the third group and were 
thus required to work normal working hours. From then on they had to earn their liv-
ing largely by themselves – and mostly without the promised retraining schemes. Many 
of them did not enjoy special sheltered workplaces but ended up in unqualifi ed, poorly 
paid ones.
6. The Pension System
In the war years the political leadership of the Soviet Union was faced with the task of 
materially supporting a constantly growing group of the population who had lost either 
their ability to work or their breadwinner, and had nothing to off er in return. Th is called 
for a clear shift of emphasis compared to the previous decade and a half, in which public 
welfare had played only a minor role. Whereas state social policies in Stalin’s “revolution 
from above” had focussed on the staff  of enterprises, now classic public welfare was re-
quired for millions of disabled persons as well as widows and orphans. Th e state accepted 
the challenge, however sought to restrict the number of applicants to limit the period 
of entitlement and to keep the benefi ts as low as possible. At most, they covered the 
absolute basics, and in many cases not even that. Th e regime was not prepared to make 
greater material concessions or fundamentally reorient its social policy.29
A fi xed public pension irrespective of previous income or military rank was already being 
paid out to the invalids of the First World War (the “imperialist war”) and the Civil War; 
with the latter receiving higher benefi ts–loyalty to the regime was fi nancially rewarded.30 
27 GARF (fi lial’) A-413/1/234, sheet 85; RGASPI 17/122/21, sheets 84–86; RGASPI 17/122/71, sheets 195–198; GARF 
(fi lial’) A-413/1/460, sheets 2, 4; RGASPI 17/131/36, sheets 3, 10.
28 O rezul’tatakh proverki raboty organov sotsial’nogo obespecheniia po obsluzhivaniiu invalidov Otechestvennoi 
voiny, April 1943: GARF 5446/44/976, sheet 118; sheet 220ff ; letter of the head of the Organisational-Instruction-
al Section of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), Slepov, to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Malenkov, 
1945: RGASPI 17/88/604, sheet 2; O sostoianii trudovogo ustroistva invalidov Otechestvennoi voiny na 1. 10. 
1949: GARF 5451/29/330, sheets 19–22.
29 See also the paper by Mark Edele in this volume. 
30 Postanovlenie SNK RSFSR, 19 March, 1935: „O normakh pensii invalidov voiny i semei lits, pogibshikh na voine“, in: 
Material’noe obespechenie, 176–177; Postanovlenie TsIK i SNK SSSR No. 86/162, 31 January, 1937: „O povyshenii 
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Th ese pensions, on the whole very low, were raised by 50% on 16 July 1940.31 At the 
same time, considerably better pensions were introduced for those soldiers, sailors and 
non-commissioned offi  cers of the Red Army and Soviet Navy who had become partially 
or completely unable to work in the course of military duty after 1 January 1938.32 From 
then on the level of their pension no longer depended solely on the degree of invalidity 
but also on their military rank and – as a new principle – on their previous income. Th is 
now had greatest infl uence on the level of pensions, and the degree of disability was a 
lesser determinant.33 Th e maximum pension was 400 roubles.34 As had been the case 
previously, too, peasants (and also students) as well as the rural population in general 
were disadvantaged. Th e following rates applied for the three invalidity groups:
Table 2
Without connection to agriculture With connection to agriculture
1st group 100 % of former wage 80 %
2nd group   75 % 60 %
3rd group   50 % 40 %35
Th ose who were peasants or students before enlistment only received a pension accor-
ding to this fi xed formula:
Table 3
Without connection to agriculture With connection to agriculture
1st group 150 roubles 120 roubles
2nd group 120 roubles 96 roubles
3rd group   90 roubles 72 roubles
As these tables show disabled soldiers of peasant origin were always disadvantaged com-
pared to workers and administrative employees and thus received a lower pension.
On 28 January 1946, the minimum pensions for disabled servicemen of the fi rst category 
razmerov pensii invalidam grazhdanskoi voiny i voennoi sluzhby v riadakh RKKA, byvshim Krasnogvardeitsam i 
Krasnym partizanam, a takzhe chlenam seme ėtikh lits“. In: Sobranie Zakonov SSSR 9, (1937), No. 30. According to 
this decision, former Red Guards and Red Partisans of all invalidity categories were paid a 25% allowance on top 
of the above-mentioned pensions and were entitled to a better “personal pension” providing they had gained 
“particular merit”: Ibidem. Corresponding requests were received by Voroshilov and others, see e.g. the letter of 
Disabled Serviceman of the Civil War, 2nd category, T. F. Agarkov of 25 January, 1948: GARF 5446/54/58, sheets 
55–54.
31 Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 1269, 16 July, 1940: „O pensiiakh voennosluzhashchim riadovogo i mladshego 
nachal’stvuiushchego sostava srochnoi sluzhby i ikh sem’iam, in: Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 19 (1940), No. 465.
32 Ibidem.
33 Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 2291, 12 November, 1940, in: Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 30 (1940), 729.
34 The original decision of 16 July, 1940 did not anticipate any deductions for persons on a wage-related pension 
who were engaged in agriculture. But the supplementary decision of the Central SNK of 12 November, 1940 
cut the pensions of this group by 20%: Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 2291, 12 November, 1940: „O dopolnenii 
postanovleniia Sovnarkoma SSSR ot 16 iiulia 1940“, in: Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 30 (1940), 729.
35 However, the pensions calculated according to this method were not allowed to fall below the rates of the fi xed 
formula.
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were raised from 150/120 roubles (city dweller / country dweller) to 300/250 roubles, i.e. 
they were doubled,36 but they still did not reach subsistence level. Th e pensions for non-
commissioned offi  cers were 25% higher than the rates given above.37 Offi  cers received 
even more. Appreciable pension increases for all disabled servicemen did not come until 
the mid 1960s.38
From early 1943 onwards the requirement to work applied to all invalids of the third 
category, and the “work-shy” risked losing their pensions. Th at proves once more the 
signifi cance of work in the Soviet welfare system. Within the group of disabled service-
men entitled to a pension, those who worked were always considerably better off  than 
those who were unable to. As a comparison shows, the pensions ranged from 72 to 400 
roubles, allowing only an exceedingly meagre life to persons completely unable to work, 
whereas some disabled servicemen in employment could reach quite a decent income. 
Only a minority enjoyed the highest pension of 400 roubles. Despite being recognised 
by the state as war invalids, the social situation of the majority of disabled “Great Patri-
otic War” soldiers meant one thing: poverty. Th e pensions alone could in no way cover 
life’s necessities, and incentives for the recipients to work remained, especially since the 
reconstruction of the country demanded the commitment of every halfway employable 
worker. Whoever wanted to get by with alternative survival strategies (which were often 
more lucrative than wages and pensions) was able to do so in relative safety until the late 
1940s, but from the early 1950s these inventive invalids were increasingly prosecuted 
as “anti-Soviet elements”.39 Until then many disabled servicemen had preferred to beg 
or to live from small-scale black-market trading; others again plied the population with 
various skills (playing the accordion, singing, parading trained animals, etc.) for a small 
donation.40
Th e pension system was meticulously graduated according to the “divide and rule” prin-
ciple – this made great diff erences in benefi ts between the individual groups of disabled 
servicemen and also led to a certain erosion of solidarity. Instead of helping foster a 
collective mentality among “comrades in misfortune”, the “misplaced egalitarianism” 
(uravnilovka) much reviled at the time was subjected to all-out attack in the fi eld of 
invalid pensions, too. Th e pensions of the “Great Patriotic War invalids” subsequently 
aroused the envy of the maimed soldiers of earlier wars, who were much less well off . 
Everyone eyed each other warily, suspecting the others of receiving more, and everyone 
was busy comparing and calculating, especially after all material bonuses connected with 
36 Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 231, 28 January, 1946: „O povyshenii razmera pensii invalidam Otechestvennoi 
voiny 1-oi gruppy“, in: Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 3 (1946), No. 35.
37 Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 19 (1940), No. 465, point 7.
38 M. Edele, Soviet Veterans of the Second World War. A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941–1991, 
Oxford 2008, 86; see also his paper in this volume. The other privileges were then also constantly extended.
39 E. Zubkova, S protjanutoj rukoj: Niščie i niščenstvo v poslevoennom SSSR, in: Cahiers du Monde russe, 49 (2008) 
2 / 3, 441–474.
40 For the manifold peculiarities of this subculture of disabled sevicemen and other marginal social groups in the 
post-war years in Leningrad, see the autobiographical stories by E. Kotschergin, Die Engelspuppe, Mannheim 
2009.
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medals were abolished without replacement in 1948, and those who were not maimed 
therefore had no more privileges worth mention.41 Hardly a complaint to public offi  ces 
went without denunciation of alleged “speculators” or the “work-shy”. A man with an 
amputated hand demanded a higher pension than one with an amputated leg because 
the latter could work, after all, he wrote in his petition.42
Despite all the instances of arbitrariness, obstinacy and red tape in the welfare offi  ces, 
pension payments were the only aspect of public care for war victims that continued 
to function more or less smoothly. It also swallowed up the lion’s share of expenditure 
on welfare.43 Although the pension payments were low, they were supplemented by a 
seemingly arbitrary maze of one-off  payments and non-cash assistance from various in-
stitutions (welfare offi  ces, Party committees, Soviets, unions, the Komsomol, enterprises, 
churches, the Red Cross, etc.).44 But these funds often benefi tted not the neediest but the 
more mobile and resourceful of the disabled servicemen, who demanded them the most 
persistently – from all welfare offi  ces at the same time. Th e professional thief and later 
fraudster Veniamin B. Vaisman pulled off  the biggest coup. Fleeing from a penal camp 
in 1944, he got such severe frostbite that both legs and one hand had to be amputated. 
Soon, however, he was passing himself off  as a disabled serviceman and twice-decorated 
“Hero of the Soviet Union”. With a row of medals dangling from his chest he systemati-
cally visited the various ministries and presented himself as a former member of staff . 
Until his arrest on 30 May 1946 he obtained over 50,000 roubles in cash as well as goods 
to the value of 30,000–40,000 roubles from 32 ministers or their deputies, and also 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party itself. In addition, he was given let-
ters of reference for a fl at, for regular therapies and for state-of-the-art prosthetic legs.45 
41 For this topic, see the paper by Mark Edele in this volume.
42 Petition of Engineer Captain Svetaev: GARF 5446/48/3245, sheet 165.
43 According to fi gures of the Minister of State Control, 95% of the budget of the Ministry of Public Welfare in 1947 
was spent on pension payments but only 5% on invalids’ homes, vocational boarding schools, sanatoriums, 
prosthetic devices, etc.: letter of the Minister of State Control, Vasiliev, to the Secretary of the Central Committee, 
Malenkov, 16 December, 1948: RGASPI 17/121/680, sheet 160.
44 For the organisation of “Invalids’ Sundays” and “Invalids’ Aid Months” by Party bodies, wounded soldier aid com-
mittees, village communities, etc., see: RGASPI 17/122/145, sheet 36; 17/122/157, sheets 81–82; 17/88/470, 
sheets 77–83; 603/1/8, sheets 192–194; 603/1/13, sheet 80; W. Eggeling, Das Sowjetische Informationsbüro. 
Innenansichten einer sowjetischen Propagandainstitution, 1945–1947, in: Osteuropa, 50 (2000) 2, 210. Similar 
activities were also organised by the Red Cross: GARF 9501/2/869, sheets 83–90; 9501/2/1187, sheets 54–65; 
9501/2/1195, sheets 10–19. The Orthodox Church also supported widows, orphans and invalids during the 
war: M. A. Vyltsan, Prikaz i propoved’: Sposoby mobilizatsii resursov derevni v gody voiny, in: Otechestvennaia 
istoriia, 3 (1995), 69–80. For aid campaigns of the Jewish communities, see: G. Kostyrchenko (Intro.): From a 
Report Concerning the Jewish Religion in the USSR in 1946, in: Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, 19 (1992) 3, 40; F. Grüner, Jüdischer Glaube im Sowjetstaat. Zur Lage der jüdischen Religion in 
der Sowjetunion in den Kriegs- und Nachkriegsjahren, in: Glaube in der 2. Welt, 30 (2002) 4, 13–19; K. Boeckh, 
Fallstudie: Lemberg in Galizien. Jüdisches Gemeindeleben in der Ukraine zwischen 1945 und 1953, in: Glaube in 
der 2. Welt, 30 (2002) 4, 24.
45 (“Top-secret”) report of the Deputy Minister of the Interior of the USSR, I. Serov, 14 June, 1947 to I. V. Stalin, V. M. 
Molotov and A. A. Zhdanov: GARF 9401/2/170, sheets 65–69 as well as Serov’s (“top secret”) report of 21 June, 
1947 to Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov and L. P. Beriia: Ibidem sheets 77–79; report of the Prosecutor General: GARF 
8131/37/3874, sheets 60–61. For the phenomen of imposture in Russia in general and in the Stalin period in 
particular, see: S. Fitzpatrick, Making a Self for the Times: Impersonation and Imposture in Twentieth-Century 
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Th e Soviet authorities never showed any such generosity towards bed-ridden, seriously 
disabled people. Th e neediest and the honest ones ultimately fell by the wayside, while 
imposters and defrauders were able to grab a large piece of the less-than-ample public 
welfare cake.
7. Reintegration into Working Life
From a purely quantitative point of view the return of disabled Soviet servicemen to 
working life turned out to be a great success. Work was ultimately considered the most 
important instrument of reintegration. In 1948/49, according to offi  cial fi gures, over 
90% of all disabled servicemen had returned to regular work and thus at least were “off  
the streets”. But the problems connected to the integration of hundreds of thousands 
of disabled servicemen were still far from solved. Above all there was a scarcity of train-
ing opportunities. A total of 173,000 disabled servicemen are said to have undergone 
retraining between 1941 and 1945, and from 1941 to 1948 it was 350,500 in the RSFSR 
alone, which indicated a considerable intensifi cation of qualifi cation schemes after the 
end of the war.46 But what do such fi gures really say? On the one hand the courses did 
not last very long, and on the other hand one should bear in mind that in 1948 more 
than half (53%) of all registered disabled servicemen47 had not completed any training 
at all48 and another large cohort could no longer practice their previous occupation. As 
such, around a million people would have needed retraining in Russia alone. Th is goal 
was never achieved – not even in quantitative terms. As far as the quality of the retraining 
schemes was concerned, most did not go beyond a brief introduction to the new job.
Many of the war-disabled peasants returned to their villages with no training at all. Al-
legedly they often took on managerial posts in the administration of kolkhozes (collec-
tive farms). As may have been the case with some disabled servicemen, the bulk of them 
ended up at the lowest end of rural society. Agricultural work is physically strenuous, and 
as only few of the invalids were still capable, many worked as farm hands.49 In 1950 just 
28.7% of disabled servicemen living in the country performed qualifi ed work.50 Th ere-
fore the proportion of simple labourers and casual workers – and thus the penury among 
Russia, in: Kritika, 2 (2002) 3, 469–487; Dies.: The World of Ostap Bender: Soviet Confi dence Men in the Stalin 
Period, in: Slavic Review, 61 (2002) 3, 535–557.
46 RGASPI 17/131/36, sheet 15. This fi gure may be greatly exaggerated like much of the Narkomsobes data, espe-
cially when one bears in mind that Sukhov stated for the war years alone: “Over 173,000 disabled servicemen 
have learned a new occupation”: Itogi raboty organov sotsial’nogo obespecheniia za gody Velikoi Otechestven-
noi voiny, 30 May, 1946: GARF (fi lial’) A-413/1/753, sheet 6.
47 RGASPI 17/131/36, sheet 10.
48 Ibidem, sheet 10.
49 This stratum made up an average of 6.5% in the kolkhozes of the RSFSR: O. M. Verbitskaia, Izmeneniia chislen-
nosti i sostava kolkhoznogo krest’ianstva RSFSR v pervye poslevoennye gody (1946–1950), in: Istoriia SSSR 5 
(1980), 137.
50 I. Kruchinin, Trudovoe i bytovoe ustroistva pensionerov v RSFSR: GARF (fi lial’) A-413/1/1380, sheet 18.
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disabled servicemen – must have been greatest in agriculture, given that the pensions 
there were among the lowest too.
Th ose invalids who had been employed in industry before the war generally tried to fi nd 
work in their old enterprises.51 Despite the great shortage of labour even employees of 
long standing were often unable to return to their old collectives.52 Severely-disabled 
ex-servicemen were most frequently rejected since the factory managers considered them 
“cripples”,53 or at least they feared that workers fi t only for limited employment would 
prevent fulfi lment of the planned production targets. Th is was the case due to the fact 
that industrial enterprises received no credit for employing disabled servicemen and the 
production goals were not lowered commensurately.54 Many companies therefore did 
not want to employ any disabled servicemen at all: “I’d rather give the job to a prisoner 
than a disabled serviceman”, the manager of the Dalstroi construction directorate said, 
commenting on the application of a war invalid.55 One manager informed the welfare 
offi  ces in advance that he “didn’t need any disabled soldiers”.56
For many disabled servicemen reintegration amounted to a demotion – even for those 
who were well qualifi ed and had only a slight physical handicap. Th ey complained to 
various authorities about this downgrading, which was manifest at all levels of industry. 
Th ere is no way of telling how often the ex-servicemen were successful in their com-
plaints. Th e problem remained unsolved and fi lled welfare-offi  ce fi les from the early 
1940s until well into the 1950s. Th e invalids employed in unqualifi ed jobs included 
many simple workers whose wounds prevented them from working in factories at the 
pace required to fulfi l the production norms57 – they had to switch to auxiliary jobs 
outside the actual production process, where hourly wages rather than piecework rates 
applied.58 Th e Ministry of Public Welfare considered their employment as watchmen, 
gatekeepers, janitors, cleaners, cloakroom men, etc.59 to be “appropriate” or a “legitimate 
51 This is according to Nesterova, head of the Public Welfare Section of Moscow’s Krasnogvardeiskii District, at a 
meeting of the Moscow staff  of the Narkomsobes, April 1943: GARF 5446/44/976, sheet 131. The Narkomgoskon 
established, however, that in the Sverdlovsk region and in Moscow, at least, the overwhelming majority of the 
disabled servicemen employed in industry had found work independently: GARF (fi lial’) A-339/1/1800, sheets 
105, 125.
52 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 93: The applicants were stopped by the plant managers and not even allowed into 
the factory: Saratov, October 1942. Three years later the situation there had still not improved: 17/122/101, 
sheet 146; 17/122/100, sheet 150. Letter from Grishakova to the Central Committee of 11 October, 1942: RGASPI 
17/122/21, sheets 76–77.
53 Stenograph of the meeting of Moscow public welfare staff , April 1943: GARF 5446/44/976, sheet 128; GARF 
(fi lial’) A-413/1/359, sheet 26.
54 GARF 5446/44/976, sheet 133.
55 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 60.
56 Letter of the People’s Commissar of State Security, Merkulov, to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Malen-
kov, 5 May, 1945: RGASPI 17/121/425, sheet 28. It gives further examples of unfounded rejections of disabled 
servicemen as workers.
57 For example, 25% of Leningrad disabled servicemen had only one arm (or only one that was fully functional). A 
commission therefore examined which industrial occupations they were still able to work in: Dokladnaia zapiska 
„O rasshirenii sfery primeneniia truda invalidov na proizvodstve“, 14 March, 1947: GARF 5451/29/242, sheet 212.
58 GARF 5451/29/128, sheet 4.
59 A. N. Sukhov, Ocherednye zadachi organov sotsial’nogo obespecheniia v oblasti trudovogo ustroistva invalidov. 
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tendency”60 and it was not seen as a problem. Many highly qualifi ed and experienced 
workers, engineers and technicians also ended up in such jobs, either because they were 
no longer able to work in their old occupation due to the war injury,61 but did not receive 
any retraining, or because the enterprises, welfare offi  ces and army commissariats placed 
this group of people against its will at the lower end of the workplace hierarchy where 
they were perceived to belong.62 Th en there were also many invalids who had been mo-
bilised into the Red Army straight from school and had no occupational training at all. 
Once disabled servicemen found employment as unskilled assistants, no one attended to 
their advancement or the raising of their qualifi cations any more.63 Th e public welfare 
offi  ces fi led the case away under “successfully referred”, and the enterprises were often 
not even informed about the number of disabled servicemen they employed.64
For many disabled servicemen the reintegration into industry was therefore accompanied 
by a drop in professional status and a loss in income, while the goods and benefi ts they 
were supposed to have priority of access to (living space, heating material, additional 
food and clothing) – another privilege of this group – either existed only on paper or 
were given to those workers who were more important for fulfi lling productions plans.65 
Th is conduct of the enterprises actually had less to do with conscious discrimination 
against disabled servicemen (although the ex-soldiers obviously saw this diff erently) than 
with fulfi lling government demands and production targets – it was de facto imposed 
“from above”. Companies were under extreme pressure to produce maximum results 
for the front or for reconstruction of the country. Disabled employees with impaired 
health and without effi  cient prosthetic devices did not fi t well into a production system 
oriented towards over-fulfi llment of the norms and whose chaotic, dangerous operations 
demanded constant improvisation.
Doklad. In: Ocherednye zadachi organov sotsial’nogo obespecheniia. Materialy Vserossiiskogo soveshchaniia 
rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov sotsial’nogo obespecheniia (mai 1945 goda), Moskva 1945, 18.
60 Ibidem 18; Sukhov, Zadachi sotsial’nogo obespecheniia, 1946: GARF (fi lial’) A-413/1/753, sheet 27.
61 Ibidem, sheet 26: Sukhov spoke in this context of a “considerable percentage”. Reconstruction required mainly 
workers able to do heavy physical work: M. Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991. Entstehung 
und Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates, München 1998, 704.
62 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheets 173–174: Kurgan region, January 1945. In some factories of the Gorkii region in early 
1945, according to Narkomsobes fi gures, 60–80% of the disabled servicemen were in unqualifi ed posts: GARF 
8131/22/221. A SNK decision of 10 July, 1945 prohibiting the employment of qualifi ed disabled servicemen 
as watchmen and janitors was passed on from the trade-unions to the enterprises: letter of the head of the 
trade-unions’ social-security section to the factory committees: GARF 5451/29/242, sheets 159–161. The Head 
of the People’s Commissariat of Tank Construction also reacted and ordered that they be relocated to qualifi ed 
positions: Order No. 552, 24 August, 1945: GARF 8131/22/103, sheet 86.
63 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 195: Rostov region, January 1945; sheet 138: Voronezh region, May 1944. Here not 
even all the available money for appropriate retraining schemes was spent; RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 113: 
Novosibirsk region, January 1945; sheet 150: Kirov region, January 1945.
64 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 113: Novosibirsk region, January 1945; sheet 150: Kirov region, early 1945; sheet 71: 
Kuibyshev region, January 1945.
65 RGASPI 17/122/21, sheet 86: October 1942; 603/1/13, sheets 148–149, Novosibirsk 1943. Naturally the lion’s 
share of goods for distribution within the enterprises went to the management and the technical specialists, 
and corruption was widespread. Workers as a social group were fundamentally disadvantaged in this arbitrary 
distribution system: D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism. Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist 
System After World War II, Cambridge 2002, 70, 73.
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Th e pressure to fulfi ll the plan weighed heavily on companies and the bold postulate 
of “all-encompassing care” did not square with reality. To be able to meet production 
goals, the enterprises resisted the expectation that they should also assume the function 
of welfare bodies, and not without justifi cation; they had diffi  culty integrating hundreds 
of thousands of disabled servicemen into the production process. It was much easier to 
use them on and off  as handymen, especially since the state’s labour policy was primar-
ily directed towards disciplining the workers through regular increases in job norms 
(without corresponding wage increases). Disabled servicemen were in no way exempted 
from this pressure but had to compete with healthy workers in everyday operations in 
the enterprise. It no longer counted that they had suff ered their physical impairment in 
the struggle to defend their motherland. Th e less the war injuries could be off set with oc-
cupational qualifi cations and medical rehabilitation, the more negatively they impacted 
on the persons aff ected. Ironically, the political leadership gave little attention to this 
aspect of dealing with the social consequences of war. Retraining schemes and also the 
supply of prosthetic devices continued to be totally inadequate, both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. Consequently the disabled servicemen not only had to cope with 
the trauma of lasting physical disfi gurement but also with substantial occupational and 
social degradation.
Even fragile livelihoods such as these were put into jeopardy:66 lay-off s of disabled servi-
cemen increased dramatically towards the end of the war and even more so in the course 
of demobilisation, repatriation and re-evacuation, which saw over twenty million people 
join or rejoin the workforce.67 For the individual this meant far more than the loss of his 
income. Redundancy meant that food-ration cards, (company-owned) accommodation 
and all other workplace-linked social benefi ts also evaporated, so the loss of one’s work-
place was a real existential blow.68 Lay-off s increased markedly in the second half of the 
1940s, especially since the state did little to counteract this development. In late 1947 
the welfare offi  ces observed blatant, large-scale displacement of disabled servicemen from 
enterprises, invalids’ cooperatives and even from outwork. Th ey were replaced by healthy 
workers, who were now available in great numbers since demobilisation.69
66 RGASPI 17/122/21, sheet 76.
67 M. Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion, 702–703.
68 Report by the head of the Social-Security Section of the Central Coucil of Trade-Unions, Gorbunov, and the head 
of the Section for Reintegration into Working Life and Care for Disabled Servicemen, Bezuglii, to trade-union 
secretary L. N. Soloviev, 1946/47: GARF 5451/29/242, sheets 1–4.
69 From the account of the Deputy Minister of Public Welfare, Nyrkov, at a meeting of the Invalids’ Cooperative 
Insurance Funds, 26 November, 1947: GARF (fi lial’) A-413/1/904, sheets 19–21. In Yaroslavl the wave of lay-off s 
of disabled servicemen lasted until 1950:  „O vypolnenii profsoiuznymi organizatsiiami Iaroslavskoi oblasti i Iaros-
lavskim otdelom sotsial’nogo obespecheniia Postanovleniia Sekretariata VTsSPS ot 10 fevralia 1950 g. ‚Ob obs-
luzhivanii invalidov voiny, truda, i semei poteriavshikh kormil’tsev‘, Ministerstvom Sotsial’nogo Obespecheniia 
RSFSR“: GARF 5451/29/397, sheet 112.
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8. Heroes without a Voice: How the State Hindered a Collective Mentality
Soviet disabled servicemen’s resentment about their poor pensions and benefi ts and the 
discrepancy between welfare-state rhetoric and their own experience of welfare grew, and 
in many cases it could hardly have been greater.70 However collective protests did not oc-
cur in the fi rst decade after the war. On the one hand, for political reasons, as the regime 
did not tolerate any social organisations (other than the Komsomol and the unions), and 
on the other hand as the invalids’ committees threatened to cast a bad light on the qual-
ity of public pensions and benefi ts for war victims. Th e regime’s almost paranoid fear of 
“unbridled associations”, in particular those of veterans and disabled servicemen, had al-
ready led to the banning of all their organisations in 1920. Th ere was therefore no living 
tradition and no example for the “Great Patriotic War” invalids to follow; there was no 
organisation that could have transformed the war victims’ grievances through offi  cially 
legitimated mediation processes – or through constant pressure from below – into politi-
cal demands which could have led to specifi c social policies. Due to the enforced lack 
of social-policy debate, the public did not perceive the welfare problems of the disabled 
servicemen as particularly serious. Since the regime continued to present the pensions 
and benefi ts for war victims in the Soviet Union (which in reality were pathetically in-
adequate) as an achievement of socialism and to contrast this with “invalids’ sad fate” in 
capitalist countries, the fi ction of “all-encompassing care” was able to be perpetuated in 
broad sections of the population long after the war, and even after the collapse of the sys-
tem.71 Since social reality lagged far behind the expectations created by the propaganda, 
the disabled servicemen who received this allegedly lavish care remained without a voice 
and were refused the opportunity of having their own organisations that could have 
infused them with a sense of common identity.
When all veterans’ and invalids’ associations were disbanded after the October Revolu-
tion it was a matter of consolidating Bolshevik rule; in 1945 the preservation of the 
Stalinist system had top priority. Many people cherished great hopes of a better life after 
Victory Day. Th ey expected material improvements but also a political breath of fresh air. 
Particularly former soldiers felt they had gained self-confi dence through their experience 
of war, and they did not hide it. After the victory they felt like “giants”, as the veteran and 
writer Kazakevich put it.72 Stalin distrusted the ex-servicemen precisely because of their 
increased self-esteem and the ability to compare, that they had developed through their 
wartime stay abroad. He feared their claims to the “fruits of victory”.
Th e traumatic memories of the war were not to be dealt with in public. Despite its war-
weariness, Soviet society was not to succumb to a “helpless contemplation of its own 
70 For the situation of disabled servicemen in the Ukraine, see: K. Boeckh, Stalinismus in der Ukraine. Die Rekon-
struktion des sowjetischen Systems nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Wiesbaden 2007, 120–122.
71 E. Iarskaia-Smirnova and P. Romanov, At the Margins of Memory. Provincial Identity and Soviet Power in Oral 
Histories, 1940–1953, in: D. J. Raleigh (Ed.), Provincial Landscapes. Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917–1953, 
Pittsburgh 2001, 308.
72 Ė. Kazakevich, Slushaia vremia. Dnevniki, zapisnye knizhki, pis’ma, Moskva 1990, 316; see also: V. Kondrat’ev, 
Paradoks frontovoi nostal’gii, in: Literaturnaia Gazeta, 9 May, 1990, 9.
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wounds”73 but be mobilised, drilled and regimented anew, and thus return to the per-
manent state of emergency so typical of the 1930s: “It soon became clear that the term 
REconstruction was to be taken literally in social terms as well: the new society was to 
be the same as before.”74 But it could not be quite the same because the demands made 
by the “Great Patriotic War” invalids on the Soviet state were not challenged as those of 
the veterans had been in 1947/48. In this respect the Pension Law of 1940 created a new 
status group, which was to enjoy a range of privileges in the long term. Th is gave rise to 
expectations that were only fulfi lled at the lowest material level and on the whole were 
deeply disappointed. Some of the full-bodied propagandistic announcements concern-
ing benefi ts remained pure propaganda–merely the pension payments were usually made 
punctually and smoothly. Being so low, however, they could not satisfy the hopes of the 
disabled servicemen. “Is this what we fought for?” was a common expression of exaspera-
tion in the post-war years. Since the paltry public benefi ts were not weighed up through 
additional symbolic recognition in the form of an invalids’ organisation, frustration and 
resentment grew. Th is was expressed in a surge of petitions and letters of complaint to 
all conceivable offi  cial bodies, Party and government offi  cials, magazine editorial boards 
and army commissariats.75
Th e welfare situation of invalids and veterans began to gradually improve in the 1960s, 
but the specifi c concerns of the war-disabled were still not taken very seriously. In this 
respect the invalids of the “Great Patriotic War” were the fi rst status group of ex-service-
men to be publically recognised, but even after the cult of the “Great Patriotic War” 
developed in the 1970s their physical and/or psychological wounds ensured that they 
continue to be its “poor victors”.
73 I. Deutscher, Stalin. Eine politische Biographie, Reinbek b. Hamburg 1992, 726.
74 M. Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion, 701.
75 See the author’s professorial dissertation, Die Invaliden des ‚Großen Vaterländischen Krieges’ – Eine politische 
Sozialgeschichte 1941–1991, Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2003; for the persistence of similar expressions of irri-
tation until into the 1950s see: B. Fieseler, Stimmen aus dem gesellschaftlichen Abseits. Die sowjetrussischen 
Kriegsinvaliden im ‚Tauwetter’ der fünfziger Jahre, in: Osteuropa 52 (2002) 7, 945–962.
